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1An Interview With Brian Loasby
Born in 1930, Brian J. Loasby is generally recognised as the leading post-Marshal-
lian economic theorist.  He has published widely on the theory of economic
organisation, methodology, and the history of economic ideas, including Smith
and Keynes.  His work includes the now-classic 
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NF:  I suppose you still feel, as Schumpeter did, that all good economists ought to
entertain an interest in economic history?
BL:  Yes, when one looks around and finds people judging situations without,
apparently, any conception that somewhat similar situations have occurred in the past,
that gives you an idea of the value of having some sense of history.  For example, David
Laidler takes this view, with which I agree, about monetary policy and monetary analysis
that way back to the 19th century and back to the 18th century, a number of quite
sensible things were said about monetary policy which have been presented as very
modern discoveries.
NF:  But this is doctrinal history, not economic history,  although of course they are
somehow related.
BL:  Yes, it is doctrinal history, but most of the work on monetary issues arose directly
out of particular problems and of course it was driven by the belief that money, and
certainly good monetary management, could have real effects on the economy.  The
idea that money does not matter was a very strange idea to most of these people.
NF:   David Ricardo may have been an exception.
BL:  Well, I suppose David Ricardo might be one of those who held that if money was
managed properly, it did not matter, but if you did not manage it properly, you could
get into trouble.
NF:  Your reference to an early political interest reminded me that one of your early
articles was about regional planning [Brian J. Loasby. 1967. “Making Location Policy
Work,” Lloyd’s Bank Review, January: 41-42.].  I wonder about the connection of that
article to your other work.
BL:  I think that was about what I was teaching at the time, that is, policy of regional
development.  I did some work when I was in Birmingham on relocation which was
directly a policy issue in that it had to do with what was appropriate for governments to
do when they were interested in relocations of industries.  So I thought, among other
3things, that what I should do in relation to that was to go back to the record and see
what had been tried.  One of the things that was kind of fairly obvious at the time was
that changes in location could invalidate the assumptions on which particular policy
measures were based.
NF:  So there is some connection to your other work here - on decision making, for
example?
BL:  Yes, the work that I did at Birmingham was very closely related to decision
making.  It  led to the rather simple point that if you are going to talk about decisions,
you have to start by saying “Why did people feel there was a need to make a decision
about that particular matter?” and “Why did firms start thinking of the possibility of
moving?”.  In fact, the reason why you start thinking about it may have quite a lot to do
with the way you think about it.  It is a mistake to believe that every decision has, as it
were, a natural form that people can discover:  people think about things in different
ways which indeed is very obvious if you think about the way economists do economics.
 The way you pose a problem can often have significant influences on the solution you
come up with, the particular analytical result you come up with.   One thing that really
interests me about decision making is the way in which problems are formulated, and
the obvious connection here with organisation: that organisational design is, as I think
of it, quite very consciously intended to lead to problems being formulated in particular
ways. The whole point in the Dupont change to a functional system was to persuade
people to think about problems in different ways because the old way of thinking about
them turned out to be not very successful in changing circumstances.
NF:  In addition to regional planning and economic history, you have, of course, also
been interested in economic methodology, the theory of the firm, perhaps a little bit of
monetary theory, in epistemology, in Keynes, etc.  It is rather an impressive range of
different topics, and a natural question is whether there is a unified theme to all of
these?
BL:  Well, I think maybe there is now.  Looking back I find myself attracted towards
Henry Mintzberg’s concept of an emergent strategy.  What basically I was all about, I
did not know at the time; and at the end it seems to be about organising knowledge,
perhaps in the form of the question, “How shall we as economist organise our
knowledge about the ways in which people organise their knowledge in the economy?”.
Putting it that way, of course, is very economical, because maybe you can transfer ideas
from one level to the other level.  I think that is what I probably have now come to
specialise in doing.  It is all accidental. 
I only became interested in how we organise our knowledge, because there
seemed to be something wrong, in some respects, in the ways in which economists were
organising their knowledge. Going back to an earlier point, having been taught micro
economics as if it were a theory about how a business man make decisions and finding
4out that it did not match very well, the question then arose: “Why do economists do
this sort of things?”. I certainly, as an undergraduate, had no interest in methodology
at all -  it was generated by problems.  What one chooses to think about rationally is
determined by what one sees as a problem situation, which is at least one bit of the
Herbert Simon approach.  Decision making is when there is a problem. 
NF:  You mentioned your undergraduate experiences. Where were you educated?
BL:  In Cambridge.
NF:  Were you exposed to the teaching of John Robinson?
BL: Yes, John Robinson was, of course, the very exponent of imperfect competition
theory and there is another aspect of that, in addition to what I have alreadt said, namely
the Robinson/Chamberlin dispute.  Chamberlin always claimed that his theory was
different from John Robinson’s theory, while Robinson said  that it is the same except
that Chamberlin began to back off because he did not want to draw the obvious
conclusions about the obvious inefficiency of the market system.   So that was another
kind of issue, which I think I sorted out quite early by recognising that they were two
different theories based on different assumptions.
NF:  Chamberlin’s being more process oriented?
BL:  Well, I do not know if I would had said process oriented at that time, but I would
now.  I think I actually have written somewhere that Chamberlin’s theory can be
regarded as being very similar to Israel Kirzner’s theory, except that Chamberlin chose
to express it in equilibrium language. 
There is this wonderful little book (in terms of ideas per page), one of the best
thing I have ever read by an economist called Romney Robinson on Edward
Chamberlin.  Romney Robinson says that Chamberlin was writing about a situation in
which there was diverse demand and an important point here is that Chamberlin started
with differentiated demand, while Joan Robinson starts with the problems with
economics of scale and there is no theory whatever in Joan Robinson’s book about why
the demand curve should fall.  It has to fall because this is the only way you can get
equilibrium so you do not argue about it.  Well, of course, having made them fall, that
is the way you get an equilibrium, and then you discover that the equilibrium is
inefficient.  Then you say, well, the inefficiency must be caused because consumers do
not understand their preferences properly or something.  The preferences have no
particular validity and therefore any reorganisation of industry which violates these
demand curves is perfectly justifiable.  But of course, Chamberlin said that these
preferences do have validity and any adjustment generates welfare losses; at least, there
is no presumption that the change will be an improvement.  
In Chamberlin’s story,  firms have problems of finding out where their customers
are and it is actually what is called a process story: firms are trying out different product
5combinations, testing them.  Chamberlin’s selling costs are part of the problem of
finding out where the customers are and letting customers know what one now has to
offer.  Nowadays, one can see that Chamberlain’s monopolistic competition theory is
a link between Marshall’s theory of external organisation and Coase’s theory of
transactions costs.  However, that is of course is not the way it happened;  it is a rational
reconstruction.
NF:  Who have been the central influences in your thought?
BL:  Well, I suppose one would have to say that we might have to start with Joan
Robinson and quite unintendedly, not at all in the way that Joan Robinson would have
wanted, but by creating the sort of problems I mentioned earlier.  Also, Dennis
Robertson, I think, in terms of attitudes.  I keep being reminded of one of the things
that Dennis Robertson wrote about highbrow opinion in economics being like a hunted
hare, that if you wait long enough, it will come back to you.  That seems to be more and
more true, given the recycling of old ideas as brilliant new discoveries and it leads one
to be less than overwhelmed by the value of whatever is being propagated at the
particular time.
Then in chronological order Cyert and March’s behavioural theory of the firm
was quite important in suggesting that there might be some other way of thinking about
decision making than the neoclassical way; what generally is called the Carnegie-Mellon
approach which was very much influenced by Herbert Simon, of course.  What was
important was not just that here was a way about thinking about things, but the
demonstration that there was indeed more than one way of thinking about things and
that the  standard of equilibrium of economics did not have an monopoly on rational
thoughts.
I think my introduction to Thomas Kuhn was also quite important. I was
introduced to Kuhn by a research student we had in Stirling, hired specifically as an
historian to look at things in ICI in a way which was not conventional inside ICI. He
connected medical innovation with Kuhn’s argument about paradigms, and his story
followed Kuhn’s argument that when you have just had a revolution and introduced a
new paradigm, that is the worst possible time to try to introduce another one; new
paradigms are extremely resistant to change.  I think that that was important because
there was no need for me to make the connection between Kuhn’s story and
commercial innovation because it had already been done for me by this young PhD
student.  I produced this piece for the Economic Journal  [Brian J Loasby (1971),
“Hypothesis and Paradigm in the Theory of the Firm”, Economic Journal 81: 863-885],
which was not taking the original Kuhn apply to economics but taking commercial
innovation interpreted á la Kuhn and applying it back to economics.
NF: When did you discover Austrian economics?
6BL: That was after nineteen-seventysix, that is, after Choice, Complexity, and Ignorance
was published.  I later learned from some of Austrians, among them Israel Kirzner, that
the book was somewhat similar to what they were up to, and they complained a little
that I had not taken notice of the Austrian tradition.
NF: You hadn’t come across Hayek’s work before 1976?
BL: No, not really.  It was undisturbed Cambridge religion in the 1940s and early
1950s that Hayek was wrong and we did not need to bother about it.  I guess it is
interesting that there were one or two things about what we were taught in Cambridge
which I was questioning and there was lots of other things which I was not. 
NF:  But in the years that have passed since then, you basically have questioned almost
all of you Cambridge background, haven’t you?
BL:  I have never been able to question very much at a time, I think.  I got a note
somewhere of something G.K. Chesterton once said, that a man must be orthodox on
most things, or he will never have time able to practice his own particular heresy.
NF:  I have noticed that you have been referring more and more to Adam Smith. You
really seems to have become increasingly interested in his thought.
BL:  Yes, certainly over the last few years, I would probably put Adam Smith on the top
of my list and in particular because of the coherence of Smith’s ideas.  I have actually
been making some notes on this recently.  Smith starts with the question of knowledge
- the essay on “The History of Astronomy” - trying to impose patterns.  Then comes
the Lectures on Rhetorics which moves beyond the earlier idea of the study of various
styles of poets and authors. His interest lies in looking up the general purposes of
communication against the background of the limits of people’s knowledge and their
wish to have organising principles.  He cites the Newtonian method as being the most
effective.  He had already said that Newton’s own theory is not necessarily  a statement
of the truth, but that it is a pattern that Newton had himself invented so that you have
this idea of rhetoric as a system of persuasion, which maybe has some connection with
the truth but is not the same thing.  But then you go to the Theory of Moral Sentiments
which is a coordination theory.....
NF:  There is also a link to economics here [in Lectures on Rhetorics]: Smith has a
sentence in which he says that exchange has a crucial element of persuasion.
BL: Yes, I was going via Theory of Moral Sentiments to make that point.  You have if
you like, the marketing concept in Smith,  exchange involves putting oneself in other
peoples shoes.  If you think about this, this famous quotation -  the butcher, the brewer,
7and the baker, and about appealing to their interests, well, you cannot  appeal to their
interests unless you know what their interests are.  It is not purely self-interest - that is
not Smith - that is not how economic activities are coordinated in Smith.  All this is
underneath The Wealth of Nations, which is a part of Adam Smith’s grand design.
NF:  But surely all the parts of this grand design are not explicitly coordinated, as it
were, by Smith?
BL:  No, they are  not, but they all belong together. You can say that Adam Smith
believed that all these fitted together, that nowadays we know better, that we do not
need to bother, but I am inclined to think that we still need to bother about it.
I am sure Marshall did. A very important way to interpret Marshall is as someone
in the Smith-tradition, who clearly felt himself to be there.  I think I should say
something about Marshall.  But I find this very difficult,  because on the one hand a lot
of the things I have done I think of as being Marshallian.  On the other hand I do not
think I have actually discovered very much directly from Marshall.  Go back and read
the Principles, and you find that Marshall have already said it, but I did not see it there
until I worked it out for myself . I don’t know how many times I read the Principles
before I actually noticed the phrase “external organisation”.  My impression is that other
people have a somewhat similar relationship to Marshall.  The first time you read the
Principles, it all seems perfectly obvious, though when you read it a second time it does
not seem quite so obvious, and when you read it the third time you begin to appreciate
that there are lots and lots of things there which you do not notice unless you are being
sensitised to them. I think this a general proposition.
NF:   Your interpretation of Marshall is very Loasbian, as it were. What have been the
reactions from other Marshall specialists?
BL:  The three leading Marshall scholars in the world, John Whitaker, Denis O’Brien
and Peter Groenewegen have all expressed agreement on parts of my interpretation -
this is probably something I should check up on - but I cannot think of any major
disagreement with any of them.
NF: What about the point, which I think can be found in your work on Marshall, that
he was indeed a genuine evolutionary economist, that he really operated with a
population perspective?
BL:  Look, I think I would have to say that, though I might have given other
impressions, I ought not to argue that Marshall’s Principles is some sort of basics text
in evolutionary economics.  It is in the true sense a neo-classical book - a new version
of classical doctrines, which is not what we nowadays mean a neoclassical book - it is a
neo-classical book.  It has a lot of Ricardo in it and it has a lot of equilibrium models
in it and things that could be developed in that kind of way and it has a lot of Cournot
8in it.  But if you take it seriously what Marshall says in those prefaces, that economics
is a difficult subject, that you have to take it step by step, that you start with the simplest
things, etc., and that the big questions are the questions about economic progress, then
 you obtain another picture.  Marshall, the Victorian, wants to improve the conditions
of the people and you can’t do that by more efficient allocation, you just have to be
more productive economically, and also very importantly, you have to change people’s
preferences. That is where he would like to get to, but you do not get there in
Principles, Volume One.   You would get further in Principles, Volume Two, but of
course Marshall never got around to writing it.  And even then, the theory of evolution
was not very well developed at that time. But you do have this Smith/Darwin
combination; for example, the statement about progress depending on increasing
differentiation of function.  This is Marshall doing what Smith praised Newton for doing
- bringing two separate things together: Marshall says biological and economic
organisation have the same principles. Of course, he also has this statement about the
importance of organisation.
NF:  That organisation aids knowledge?
BL:  Yes.  Knowledge depends both on the division of labour, in the way Smith told
it, and on organisation. You get this differentiation and organisation story, and this is the
growth story - this is the Smith/Darwin growth story in Marshall.  It can be found in
Industry and Trade; there is a chapter about the American way of doing things and a
chapter about the German way of doing things.  It is incredibly up to date in some ways;
very close to what some people are doing on national systems of innovation and to
Porter’s work on the competitive advantages of nations.
So that is a very important part of Marshall;  it is not the hole of Marshall because
he is interested in price theoretic questions.  But even in that, the statical equilibrium
stuff, if you read it all carefully, there are lots and lots of warnings about that this is the
mechanical model and you have to be careful when you apply it, etc.  This is the kind
of mess that people got into in the 1920s in the debate on increasing returns.
NF:  And in the 1930s in the discussion of socialist allocation, as Mises and Hayek
pointed out. I suppose this similarity between Marshall and the Austrians also helped
you become interested in Austrian economics.  I also want to ask you about your
opionion about what goes on in Austrian economics these days?
BL:  Well, I think that Austrian economics is getting more interesting as it is getting less
monolithic.  This is perhaps partly a matter of self-confidence; there was a period when
they felt that they had a particular position to defend against almost everybody else in
the world; you were either inside the circle or you were outside, and if you were inside
you had to stick completely to the doctrine.
9NF:  One could argue that there is a large number of fellow travellers, such as Dick
Langlois, Ulrich Witt, yourself.... - and that they are actually doing the good Austrian
work.
BL:  Perhaps that is right.  In this connection, I think that if Lachmann had been alive
and had been a bit younger he would be much more welcome among the Austrians
now.  He was regarded as a dangerous figure.  He was inclined to give too much away
- saying nice things about Keynes, for example.
NF:  Saying nice things about Keynes is just among many similarities between your
work and Lachmann’s work.  Another one could be your shared admiration for
Shackle’s work. I suppose you felt rather close intellectually to Lachmann?
BL: Yes, one of the major regrets is that I did not had more to do with him.  I had the
opportunity to starting a correspondence with him a few years before he died, but I
never actually met him.  I guess that the reason why I didn’t was that I didn’t feel that
I was quite ready; there were things that I would like to say, but I did not really have
myself sorted out.  I will always be in a situation where not having myself sorted out, I
think.  But I had a really interesting exchange with him about the way Frank Hahn’s
attitude had been changing, and Lachmann said something to the effect that Hahn is
much too intelligent and much too keen a observer of the economic scene not to see
the danger of particular sorts of developments.  I actually later met Frank, who was,
first, very surprised that Lachmann had though it worth while to send his best wishes,
but secondary, very pleased to receive them.
NF:  Yes, Hahn is interesting.  You know that he has relatively recently (“The Next
Hundred Years”, Economic Journal 101 (1991): 47-50) written something like that
“economics in the future will return to its earlier liaisions with theoretical biology”, or
something like that.
BL:  Just after that was published, a number of people that were shaking their heads
and were saying “We wish Hahn had not written this; he is betraying the tradition of
economics”.
NF:  But of course you agree with Hahn.  This brings us to evolutionary economics.....
BL:  Evolutionary economics is, I think, a much less well defined field than
mainstream economics, which in itself have become difficult to define nowadays.
NF:  There has latest been this tendency to think of evolutionary economics in terms
of methods, such as genetic algorithms, classifier systems,  etc., and as being defined by
those methods.  Do you support this view?
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BL:  Well, my idea of evolutionary economics simply is that you need three things: one
is that you need some kind of system that generates variety and two is that you need
some kind of selection  processes, and, three, you need some kind of persistency. 
Now, it seems to me that there is no reason whatever why any of these three
components should be analysed in the same way that biologists analyse the equivalent
in biological systems.  Although I think there is a requirement if you are thinking about
human processes, human processes should not be in conflict with the biological story
of what humans are actually capable of doing.
I don’t think I have any exclusive views on methods - I just think you should
always be very careful.  For example, it doesn’t seem to me to be illegitimate to make
equilibrium part of one’s way of understanding economic evolution, particularly if you
think of equilibrium as a way of explaining the way in which something persist, because
you do need something to persist in an evolutionary story.  But the general equilibrium
model, which explain why everything persists - nothing would change - seems to be
relevant only as a kind of foil, a description of what the world would have to be if no
evolution would ever take place (this is a Hahnian argument).
It does worry me when people try to use equilibrium theory as a way of avoiding
explaining the processes. It worries me a little bit that a lot of evolutionary biology is
actually equilibrium biology.  I thought that the argument was that only by
understanding the processes can we properly understand the outcome and only by
understanding the outcome can we understand the processes.  Walras’ idea was that
you start with the equilibrium.  If you cannot show that there is an equilibrium solution,
then there is no point in trying to find out how you get to it.  So it is perfectly legitimate
to say that first of all, let us see if there is an equilibrium and then go and see how the
process is.  It seems that people reach the conclusion now that the requirement for an
existence proof is incompatible with the requirement of telling a process story.  I think
in fact that this is what Franklin Fisher has done [Franklin M. Fisher. 1983.
Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press].  I do not think that anybody has gone beyond Fisher, who says that
you need some highly implausible conditions, namely “no favorable surprises”: you do
not discover any new opportunities on the way - but any story about process and
development is about discovering opportunities on the way.
NF:  General equilibrium theory really seems to have been falling out of favour among
mainstream economists.  It probably all has to do with the rise of game theory, applied
game theory, the rise of industrial organisation economics, etc.
BL:  Yes, it seems to me that one of the attractions of game theory for the more
methodologically inclined is that it appears to solve the equilibration problem.  The
equilibration problem is false trading and the false trading changes the equilibrium. But
in game theory everybody just sits down and works it all out.  You do not actually play
the game from the beginning and there is no possibility of false trading.
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NF: Perhaps we should finally talk a little bit about the firm and organisations. I t strikes
me that you really began, not as an organisation theorist, but at least as someone very
interested in organisation theory, and in some ways Choice, Complexity, and Ignorance
is an organisation theory book.  But you don’t seem to be very much interested in
organisation per se any longer.
BL:  That is probably true.  But I have actually very recently read the volume Oliver
Williamson edited about Chester Barnard and have gone back to reading Barnard. I
am intrigued by the point that one of the functions of the executive is changing peoples
preferences inside the organisation.  This is something that needs to be developed. 
Safeguards against opportunism are an important part of the story, but there is a lot
more to the story than that. And, of course, the Barnard argument about changing
preferences is of course a process view, and the fundamental trouble, I think, with
Williamson’s transaction cost economics is that it is  an equilibrium story.
NF:  And it is also a story that neglects all sorts of cognitive factors, whereas the main
organisational design problem perhaps really is getting everybody on the same cognitive
wavelength.
BL:  Well,  maybe, but there is the other side of that - the opportunity costs of that -
if you get everybody on the same wavelength, there are lots of innovations that will
never happened.  The very important policy implication of that is that national
champions are likely to be a very bad idea.
NF:   Do you see transaction cost economics and work on firm capabilities as two
distinct fields or as converging or related fields?
BL:  I think this is one of the things Mark Casson is actually very good at thinking
about.  He begins by reinterpreting the transaction cost story of firms, and sees them
as intermediaries in the economic system that reduce the transaction costs compared
with the system in which the consumers have to deal directly with factor owners.  One
of the very important aspects of this is that in standard transaction cost economics,
transaction costs have, if you like, the properties of standard production functions: for
any transaction there is a determinate cost for anybody who wishes to take this
transaction.  I think it is a very valuable part of Casson’s argument that the costs of
transaction depends on who is doing the transaction and how they are doing it.  Firms
develop specific capabilities in transactions.
The question that Coase was getting at in 1937 about how to distinguish the costs
of making arrangements from the costs of performing the actually operation of this
generating product or services is clearly something that is very important.  However, I
think there are a couple of problems here.  One is that the convenient separation of
production activities and transaction activities comes at a cost. What it misses out is the
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Chandler story of increasing the transaction costs in order to be able to reduce the
production costs.
NF:  One of your contributions to theory of the firm has been to argue that it should
be seen as a reserve.  What do you really mean by this?
BL:  I developed the idea with reference to Menger and Hicks’ work on liquidity,
which built on the idea that reserves are in general pools of resources, which you only
require because you do not have sufficient information about what is going to happen
in the future.  Well, Coase’s explanation of the firm is essentially also that the firm
exists because people do not know what is going to happen in the future.  Therefore,
the concept of reserve should be applicable to firms.
This also connects to capabilities.  We will have to bring back the Austrians 
again, and specifically the Austrian idea of capital as a collection of assets, which are
related together. If you simply extend that to human capital, then capabilities can be
formed as a collection of such capital assets, which can deliver services, to use the
Penrose term.  One of the essential things about the Austrians’ conception is that these
capital structures are oriented; they are not general purpose.  Capabilities are also
oriented; in fact, it seems to me that this is part of what Penrose means by “the
productive opportunity” - that the firm’s resources are oriented in a particularly
direction.  By exercising capability you find out things you did not know. What is the
range of a capability is never fully known.  Computers and computer production are,
of course, the actually classical example. Computer manufactures have, in general, very
vague ideas about to which use the machines could be put. The range of possibilities
are not very well defined and can also change as one goes along; people find that it can
do things they did not know it could do.
NF: Professor Loasby, thank you for your time and patience.
_____________________________
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